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Tyranny on Trial: Regional Courts Crack Down on Mugabe's Land
"Reform." By Daniel Hemel & Andrew Schalkwyk
INTRODUCTION
One night in June 2008, militants associated with Zimbabwe's ruling
ZANU-PF Party stormed a citrus farm owned by seventy-four-year-old Mike
Campbell, breaking four of his ribs and his collarbone' while inflicting such
severe brain damage that Campbell now has difficulty in adding simple sums.
2
In April 2009, the militants returned to seize the farm; in August, they burned
down the house where Campbell and his family had lived for nearly four
decades.
3
A much less violent-but equally dramatic--event occurred on March
30, 2010, when attorneys representing Campbell and seventy-seven other
white Zimbabwean farmers attached a luxury home in Cape Town, South
Africa owned by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.4 The attachment is a far cry
from full compensation for Campbell and his co-plaintiffs-and only covers
the plaintiffs' legal costs of 113,000 rand (approximately US$15,500) 5 -but it
marks a rare instance of an oppressive regime being held to account for its
human rights abuses. Moreover, it shows that the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Tribunal, a court that opened for argument
only three years ago, may be a much more powerful force for human rights in
the region than the tribunal's founders ever foresaw.
When Southern African leaders gathered in Windhoek, Namibia in
August 1992 to sign the SADC Treaty, attendees hailed the "historic
occasion" and announced the dawn of a new era of regional integration.6 But
Article 16 of the Treaty,7 establishing a regional court, was an afterthought at
the time; the tribunal did not come into being for nearly another decade and a
half. In the meantime, SADC made modest steps toward trade liberalization
but accomplished very little on the political front. Regional leaders have been
unwilling to intervene in member-state affairs, and many observers have
dismissed the organization as a "talking shop." 8 SADC's weaknesses are on
1. Robyn Dixon, They Beat Him, but Not into Submission, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2008,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/07/world/fg-farmer7.
2. Robyn Dixon, Tough Zimbabwe Farm Family Survives Another Blow, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
7, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/07/world/fg-zimbabwe-farmer7.
3. Id.
4. See Tony Hawkins, Zimbabwe Farmers Seize State Property, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4abf49dc-3cda- I ldf-bbcf-00144feabdc0.html; Stephan Hofstatter, Zimbabwe
Properties Attached To Pay Farmers, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.), Mar. 30, 2010, http://www.businessday.co.za/
articles/Content.aspx?id=104924.
5. See Hofstatter, supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., Accadoga Chiledi, Africa: Southern African Development Community Is Born,
INTER PRESS SERV., Aug. 17, 1992.
7. Treaty of the Southern African Development Community art. 16, Aug. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
116, 126.
8. See, e.g., Cris Chinaka, Doubts over Mugabe's Summit Attendance, MAIL & GUARDIAN (S.
Afr.), Apr. 11, 2008, available at http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-04-1 l-doubts-over-mugabes-summit
-attendance; Editorial, The Mere Talk Shop That Is A U and SADC, MMEGI ONLINE (Bots.), Feb. 8, 2008,
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dramatic display in Zimbabwe: after years of inaction, the SADC Summit-
the closed-door body of regional heads of state-finally brokered an accord
between President Robert Mugabe and his political rivals in 2008, but it stood
on the sidelines as Mugabe brazenly breached the agreement's terms.
9
In contrast to the political paralysis of the SADC Summit, the new
tribunal is active in the region. Over the past three years, it has issued a series
of rulings condemning Zimbabwe's land reform program and potentially
affording monetary compensation to Mugabe's victims. As with the SADC
Summit, the tribunal must rely on member states to enforce its rulings. But
this obstacle has not been insurmountable: the Zimbabwean Supreme Court
has recognized-at least in principle-the binding effect of tribunal decisions,
and South African courts are allowing private parties to enforce SADC
judgments against other member states inside South Africa's borders. The
experience of the tribunal so far shows that domestic and supranational judges
may be able to establish a regional human rights regime even when heads of
state lack the will to act and regional political institutions are crippled by
inertia.
I. MIKE CAMPBELL (PVT) LTD. V. REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE
Although land reform in Zimbabwe began three decades ago when the
country transitioned from a white-dominated government to majority rule, the
process became much more rapid-and more ruthless-in 2000, when pro-
Mugabe mobs moved onto thousands of white-owned farms across the
country.10 Three years later, Zimbabwe's parliament passed Amendment 17 to
the constitution, allowing presidential appointees to expropriate farms without
compensation or judicial review.11 Amid these violent land grabs, production
on Zimbabwe's white-owned farms-which had accounted for three-quarters
of the state's agricultural output-ground to a halt. The violence has displaced
more than 4000 of Zimbabwe's 4500 white farm owners 12 and approximately
one million black farm workers.
13
Having been notified that the government intended to acquire his land,
Mike Campbell brought a challenge to the validity of Amendment 17 in the
Zimbabwe Supreme Court in 2006. Campbell's counsel argued that
Amendment 17 was invalid because it contravened the "core values" and
"essential features" of the Zimbabwean Constitution. 14 However, in March
http://www.mmegi.bw/index.phpsid=9&aid=43&dir=2008/February/Friday8.
9. See, e.g., Violet Gonda, Zimbabwe: Jimmy Carter Says SADC Ineffective in Dealing with
Country, SW RADIO AFR. (London), Nov. 24, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200811241516.html.
10. Simon Robinson, Power to the Mob, TIME EUR., May 1, 2000, available at
http://205.188.238.18 1/time/europe/magazine/2000/0501/cover.html.
11. CONS'r. OF ZIMB. § 16B, amended by Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act,
2005, available at http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/cms/UsefulResourses/ZimbabweConstitution.pdf.
12. Zim White Farmers' Struggle, NEWS24.coM (S. Afr.), Feb. 23, 2010, http://www.news24.
com/Content/Africa/Zimbabwe/966/385966c8893e495fbd34652d93ed98ae/23-02-2010-10-06/Zim_
whitejfarmers-struggle.
13. Ann Heilman, Zimbabwe: One Million Casualties of Land Reform, INTER PRESS SERV.,
Jan. 25, 2010.
14. Mike Campbell (PvT) Ltd. v. Minister of Nat'l Sec. Responsible for Land, Land Reform
& Resettlement, [2008] ZWSC I, at 2, http://www.saflii.org/zw/cases/ZWSC/2008/l .pdf.
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2007, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court reserved judgment in Campbell's
case,' 5 and in October of that year, Campbell turned to the SADC Tribunal for
an injunction to protect Campbell's rights while his case was resolved before
Zimbabwe's courts.
Campbell's was the first case heard by the tribunal. 16 According to the
Protocol to the SADC Treaty, the court has "jurisdiction over all disputes...
which relate to ... the interpretation and application of the [SADC] Treaty,"'' 7
but the scope of this provision had yet to be tested. Article 4 of the SADC
Treaty provides that "SADC and Member States shall act in accordance with
the ... principles ... [of] human rights, democracy, and the rule of law,"'
' 8
and Article 6 provides that "SADC and Member States shall not discriminate
against any person on [the] grounds of gender, political views, race, ethnic
origin, culture, or disability."' Campbell argued that Zimbabwe's land reform
program ran afoul of both provisions; thus, his dispute with the Zimbabwean
government "relate[d] to ... the application of the ... Treaty."
In December 2007, the tribunal issued an interim ruling in which it
deferred judgment on Campbell's substantive claims but confirmed that the
tribunal had jurisdiction: "This is a matter that requires interpretation and
application of the [SADC] Treaty," the tribunal stated.20 Although the three-
judge panel acknowledged that the Protocol requires plaintiffs to exhaust
domestic remedies before bringing suit in the regional court, it issued an
interim order enjoining Zimbabwe from evicting Campbell or "interfer[ing]
21with [his] peaceful residence" on his farm. Ultimately, the tribunal allowed
seventy-seven other white farmers to join Campbell's SADC suit.22
Meanwhile, in January 2008, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court threw out
Campbell's challenge to the constitutionality of Amendment 17. The Court
roundly rejected Campbell's argument that the Zimbabwean Constitution
contained essential features that could not be overridden by
amendment.23 Having exhausted his domestic remedies, Campbell was now
clear to proceed with his suit in the tribunal.
The SADC Tribunal, in its November 2008 4-1 judgment, concluded
that the Zimbabwean government had breached its obligations under Article 4
of the SADC Treaty by denying Campbell and the seventy-seven other
farmers the "right of access to the courts and the right to a fair hearing, which
are essential elements of the rule of law." 24 It also concluded that "although
15. Court Reserves Judgment in Farmers' Case, HERALD (Zimb.), Mar. 24, 2007,
http://allafrica.com/stories/200703260013.html.
16. Landmark Farm Case at SADC Tribunal, NAMIBIAN, Dec. 11, 2007,
http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&txttnews[tnews]=32965&nocache=l.
17. Protocol on Tribunal and Rules and Procedures Thereof, art. 15, para. 2, Aug. 7, 2000,
http://www.sadc.int/tribunal/protocol.php.
18. See Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, supra note 7, art. IV.
19. Id. art. VI, para. 2.
20. Mike Campbell (PvT) Ltd. v. Republic of Zimb., [2007) SADCT 1, at 3, http://www.saflii.
org/sa/cases/SADCT/2007/1 .rtf.
21. Id.
22. The order is unpublished. For the judgment, see Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. v. Republic of
Zimb., [2008] SADCT 2, http://www.saflii.org/sa/cases/SADCT/2008/2.pdf.
23. Mike Campbell (PvT) Ltd. v. Minister of Nat'l Sec. Responsible for Land, Land Reform
& Resettlement, [2008] ZWSC 1, http://www.saflii.org/zw/cases/ZWSC/2008/l.pdf.
24. Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd., [2008] SADCT 2, at 26.
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Amendment 17 does not explicitly refer to white farmers . . . its
implementation affects white farmers only and consequently constitutes
indirect discrimination or de facto or substantive inequality."2 5 The tribunal
ordered Zimbabwe to compensate three of the farmers who had already been
evicted and "to ensure that no action [be] taken" to oust Campbell and the
seventy-four others from their lands.26
II. EFFORTS TO ENFORCE THE JUDGMENT
The Zimbabwean government scoffed at the SADC Tribunal's order.
Mugabe described the decision as "absolute nonsense."2 7 In April 2009,
pro-Mugabe militants forcibly evicted Campbell.28 The following month,
Campbell filed an urgent application to the SADC Tribunal seeking to have
the Zimbabwean government held in contempt of court. In June, the tribunal
concluded that Zimbabwe had breached the November 2008 ruling, and it
referred the matter to the SADC Summit "to take appropriate action." 9 At the
same time, it ordered the Zimbabwean government to pay Campbell's legal
costs.30 But at the September SADC Summit, instead of condemning Mugabe,
the heads of the SADC member states called for an end to international
sanctions against Zimbabwe.3 1
Meanwhile, two of the parties to Campbell's SADC suit sought to
register the tribunal's decision in Zimbabwean court. Although government
lawyers argued that SADC rulings were not binding in Zimbabwe because
Mugabe had repudiated the tribunal's jurisdiction, Zimbabwean High Court
Judge Bharat Patel dismissed the government's arguments as "essentially
erroneous and misconceived." To the contrary, Patel found that "the decisions
of the tribunal are binding and enforceable within the territories of Member
States." However, Patel, following South African common law, stated that a
foreign judgment is not enforceable in domestic court if it is "in conflict with
public policy." In light of the land reform policy pursued by the Mugabe
government, Patel concluded that the SADC judgment could not be enforced
by Zimbabwean courts.
32
Rebuffed by the Zimbabwean High Court, Campbell and two other farm
owners turned to the High Court of South Africa. While acknowledging the
procedure's "novelty," Campbell's lawyers were confident that "the common
25. Id. at 53.
26. Id. at 59.
27. Cris Chinaka, Mugabe Says Zimbabwe Land Seizures Will Continue, MAIL & GUARDIAN
(S. Afr.), Feb. 28, 2009, available at http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-02-28-mugabe-says-zimbabwe
-land-seizures-will-continue.
28. See Jan Raath, Anti-Mugabe Farmer Mike Campbell Who Stood Up to Thugs Loses His
Land, TIMES (London), Apr. 8, 2009, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/
africalarticle6055794.ece.
29. Campbell v. Republic of Zimb., [2009] SADCT 1, at 3, http://www.saflii.org/sa/cases/
SADCT/2009/1 .pdf.
30. Id.
31. Scott Baldauf, African Leaders Embrace Mugabe at SADC Summit, CHRISTIAN SCL
MONITOR, Sept. 11, 2009, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2009/091l/p06sl0
-woaf.html.
32. Gramara (Pvt) Ltd. v. Republic of Zimb., (2010] ZWHHC 1, http://www.saflii.org/zw/
cases/ZWHHC/2010/1 .pdf.
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law on recognition and enforcement was clear enough to indicate that
prospects were good," and they believed that registering the judgment in
South Africa would "vindicate the rule of law in the region and end
impunity." 33 Campbell's attorneys argued that the application met all of the
common law criteria for registration and noted that the Zimbabwean High
Court had recognized the validity of the SADC Tribunal. Although the public
policy argument against enforcement of the judgment had prevailed before the
Zimbabwean High Court, they noted that "the South African domestic public
policy is clearly in favour of registering the rulings," since South Africa
"abhors racial discrimination [and] arbitrary expropriation. " 34 As a test run,
and because quantification of the full compensation for the expropriated farms
35
was yet to be decided by the regional court, the suit was limited to recovery
of the legal fees already awarded by the tribunal.3 6
The farmers' application went unopposed by the Zimbabwean
government. In a single paragraph decision delivered on February 25, the
High Court of South Africa registered the decisions of the SADC Tribunal and
calculated the farmers' costs to be 112,780.13 rand (approximately
US$15,5 00)37 The attachment of the Cape Town property was a first step
toward enforcing this ruling. 8
CONCLUSION
On the one hand, the Campbell case and the parallel litigation in South
African courts highlight the limits of human rights law. Nearly a year has
passed since the tribunal in Windhoek instructed the SADC Summit to "take
appropriate action" in the Campbell case. Courts seemingly cannot compel
heads of state to act when political will is absent.
On the other hand, the tribunal's burgeoning docket demonstrates that
Southern Africans of all races see the regional court as a counterweight to
human rights abuses by government officials. In 2008, Luke Muyandu
Tembani, a black commercial farmer in Zimbabwe whose lands were seized
by a state bank because he defaulted on a mortgage, sued the Mugabe
33. E-mail from Frank Pelser, Attorney, to Andrew Schalkwyk (Mar. 15, 2010, 3:43:15 EST)
(on file with authors).
34. Applicants' Heads of Argument 32, Fick v. Gov't of the Republic of Zimb., Case No.
77881/2009 (High Ct. S. Aft. Feb. 25, 2010).
35. E-mail from Frank Pelser, supra note 33.
36. Applicants' Heads of Argument, supra note 34, 55.
37. Fick v. Gov't of the Republic of Zimb., Case No. 77881/2009 (High Ct. S. Aft. Feb. 25,
2010), http://www.saflii.org/userfiles/file/CourtOrders/South%2OAfrican%2Court%20ruling%2on%2
OSADC.pdf.
38. Two related cases suggest that Mugabe's victims may find South African courts amenable
to their claims. First, in July 2008, the High Court of South Africa ordered the South African
government to "take all necessary steps" to protect the rights of a white South African citizen who had
lost land in Zimbabwe to Mugabe. In the same case, the court ruled in February 2010 that the South
African government was financially liable for its inaction. Von Abo v. Gov't of the Republic of S. Aft.,
[2010] ZAGPPHC 4, at 4, http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2010/4.pdf. Second, in November
2009, the same court recognized a settlement agreement between the South African government and one
of Campbell's co-plaintiffs stating that a bilateral investment treaty between Pretoria and Harare did not
affect the plaintiff's rights to enforce SADC Tribunal judgments in South Africa. Stephan Hofstatter,
Benchmark Ruling Paves Way for Zimbabwe Treaty, Bus. DAY (S. Afr.), Nov. 27, 2009, available at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200911270329.html.
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government in the SADC Tribunal. The following year, the regional court
ruled that the state bank "had acted against the principles of natural justice"
because it did not allow Tembani to contest the amount of the alleged
debt before "an independent and impartial" judge. 39 Meanwhile, a small
Zimbabwean political faction that was excluded from the (ill-fated) 2008
power-sharing agreement between Mugabe and the main oposition party
petitioned the SADC Tribunal to set aside the 2008 accord. . And in early
2010, a union representing Zimbabwe's black farm workers-who have
suffered the most severe losses as a result of land reforma '-announced that it
too would sue the Mugabe government before the Windhoek court.4 2
As a symbolic matter, the court's condemnations of the Mugabe
government may carry greater weight than those of Western governments and
NGOs who deliver the same message. Whereas the Mugabe regime has
deployed anti-imperialist rhetoric effectively against the latter category of
critics, 43 Mugabe's pan-Africanist propaganda will sound even more strained
when directed against an African court, especially one whose legitimacy has
been affirmed by the Zimbabwean judiciary. Moreover, the possibility that
South African courts will enforce tribunal orders by attaching Zimbabwean
assets means that Mugabe's victims may be able to obtain some monetary
compensation-albeit not full redress-for their suffering.
If litigants succeed in attaching more of Zimbabwe's nondiplomatic
assets in South Africa, the impact on the Mugabe regime may be much more
powerful than the sanctions imposed by the United States and the European
Union. As of 2009, South Africa accounted for approximately 42% of
Zimbabwe's exports and 62% of its imports (compared to 22% and 9%
respectively from the European Union)." Thus if litigants succeeded in
attaching Zimbabwean assets across the SADC region, well over half of
Zimbabwe's international trade could be affected. Although Campbell and his
co-plaintiffs so far only have targeted Zimbabwe-owned real estate, the South
African human rights group AfriForum maintains that the farmers could
potentially attach other assets such as Air Zimbabwe jets.4' In short, the
39. Tembani v. Republic of Zimb., [2009] SADCT 3, http://www.saflii.org/sa/cases/SADCT/
2009/3.pdf, see also Brigitte Weidlich, SADC Tribunal Rules Farm Repo by Agri Bank of Zimbabwe
Illegal, NAMIBIAN, Aug. 17, 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200908240045.html. Zimbabwe has
refused to comply with the tribunal's order. Evicted Farmer's Property Sold, LEGAL MONITOR (Zimb.),
Nov. 2, 2009, at 4, available at http://www.sokwanele.com/system/files/LM-19.pdf.
40. The regional court concluded that since the faction, the United People's Party, did not
have any elected representatives in the National Assembly or Senate, its exclusion could be supported on
the basis of "objective criteria," and its application was denied. United Peoples' Party of Zimb. v.
SADC, [2009] SADCT 4, http://www.saflii.org/sa/cases/SADCT/2009/4.pdf.
41. See, e.g., GEN. AGRIC. & PLANTATION WORKERS UNION OF ZIMB., IF SOMETHING IS
WRONG... : THE INVISIBLE SUFFERING OF COMMERCIAL FARM WORKERS AND THEIR FAMILIES DUE TO
"LAND REFORM" (2009), available at http://changezimbabwe.com/images/PortableDF/somethingis
wrong III 109.pdf.
42. Clara Smith, Union Wants SADC Court Protection, ZIMONLINE, Feb. 4, 2010,
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?Articleld=5670.
43. See, e.g., Ian Phimister & Brian Raftopoulos, Mugabe, Mbkei & the Politics of Anti-
Imperialism, 101 REV. AFRICAN POL. EcON. 385 (2004).
44. See World Trade Org., Trade Profile: Zimbabwe (Mar. 2010), http://stat.wto.org/
CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Country-=ZW.
45. SA Court Ruling Deals Blow to Mugabe Land Seizures, ZIMONLINE, Feb. 26, 2010,
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?Articleld=5770.
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SADC Tribunal-working in tandem with national courts-may be able to
impose economic sanctions on the Mugabe regime for its human rights
abuses. As the economic center of the region and home to an independent
judiciary, South Africa might prove to be the ideal forum for the enforcement
of international and regional human rights norms.
If the SADC Tribunal continues to issue anti-Mugabe rulings, and if
domestic courts choose to enforce those rulings by attaching nondiplomatic
assets, the political paralysis of the SADC Summit may become a blessing in
disguise for Mugabe foes. In theory, the SADC leaders could curtail the
tribunal by amending the court's Protocol and limiting its jurisdiction.
Alternatively, they could screen future nominees to the court with the goal of
altering its ideological composition over the long term. However, amending
the Protocol would require a degree of coordination among SADC heads of
state that the Summit has not demonstrated in recent years. Moreover, several
SADC states have taken a hard line against the Mugabe regime.46 Each
member state can block any action by the consensus-dependent Summit.
Finally, since each can nominate one of its own nationals to the court, it is
unlikely that pro-Mugabe jurists will capture all of the tribunal's seats. The
inertia that has overcome the SADC Summit so far means that the tribunal
cannot rely on the regional organization's political branch to enforce its
rulings. But the same inertia may mean that the court will have free rein for
the foreseeable future.
46. See, e.g., Stephean S. Kingah & Stefan Smis, The Southern African Development
Community (SADC), REP. ON INT'L ORGS., Winter 2010, http://asil.org/rio/sadc.html (noting that leaders
of Botswana and Zambia have been "very critical" of Mugabe); David McKenzie, Zimbabwe: Mugabe a
Fallen African Hero, CNN.CoM, June 26, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/affica/06/26/
zimbabwe.explainer (noting that Mugabe "has received strident criticism from Botswana, Tanzania and
... Angola").
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Military Commissions at a Crossroads: Defining the "Law of War" on
Terrorism. By Sara Aronchick Solow
The meaning of "terrorism" under U.S. domestic law and under
international law differs significantly. This became strikingly clear in January
2010, when the military commission system put in place by the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 wrestled with its first two cases on appeal.' As the
government argued before the Court of Military Commissions Review,
U.S. law has a relatively low bar for what constitutes terrorism. 2 Acts of
conspiracy, "material support," and the circulation of propaganda all qualify
and are punishable by harsh sentences.3 Under international law, meanwhile,
there is a substantially higher bar for what constitutes a terrorist act. As the
defendants in the proceedings of early 2010 demonstrated, conspiracy and
"material support" are not terrorism under international law, and such acts
would not give rise to harsh penalties under an international or domestic court
applying the international law doctrines.4
Given that U.S. and international law diverge on the substance of
terrorism, military commissions convened in the United States for the purpose
of trying alien combatants will be forced to pick among these varying legal
standards. Under the Military Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009, Congress
erected a system of Article I courts for prosecuting "unprivileged enemy
belligerents," and it directed the commissions to adjudicate alleged violations
of the "law of war." 5 As cases before the commissions increase, the judges
will be forced to resolve a yet unsettled question: what "law of war" should
they apply? This Recent Development argues that in the interest of
constitutional law and international comity, military commissions should draw
solely from international authorities when adjudicating and defining the "law
of war" on terrorism.
I. "TERRORISM" UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW
Under international law, terrorism (or as the report puts it, the "direct
participation in hostilities" by civilians) was defined by the International
1. Jess Bravin, White House Defends Use of War Crimes Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704905604575027551871743276.html. The
cases were those of Salim Ahmed Hamdan and Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul, both of whom had
been convicted by military commissions established pursuant to the Military Commissions Act of 2006,
and were appealing their convictions before the newly reconstituted Court of Military Commission
Review. See U.S. Dep't of Defense, Office of Military Comm'ns,
http://www.defense.gov/news/courtofinilitarycommissionreview.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
Although Mr. Hamdan has already completed serving his sentence, he brought an appeal to clear his
reputation. Bravin, supra.
2. Brief on Behalf of Appellee at 17-18, United States v. al Bahlul, CMCR Case No. 09-001
(U.S. Court of Military Comm'n Review Oct. 21, 2009).
3. Id.
4. Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 23-25, al Bahlul, CMCR Case No. 09-001 (U.S. Court of
Military Comm'n Review Sept. 1, 2009).
5. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 948b(a), 123 Stat. 2190
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 47A (2006)); see also Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
§ 948b(a), 120 Stat. 2600 (using the older term "unlawful enemy combatants" but also directing the
commissions to adjudicate "violations of the law of war").
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Committee on the Red Cross (ICRC) in a report released in May 2009.6 The
ICRC is a body whose "special position" in the field of armed conflict is
recognized under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 7 and while its legal
opinions are not directly binding on any international actor, they are routinely
relied upon by drafting committees for treaties as well as by courts applying
international law.8 In 2003, the ICRC sponsored a working group whose
mandate would be to publish "interpretive guidance" on what activities
amount to terrorism. Such a report was critical, the ICRC believed, because
the international community needed clarification on who, in modem-day
warfare, should be afforded civilian protections, given the range of ways that
persons participate in hostilities. 9 The ICRC group met with practitioners and
scholars for five years. It surveyed Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, Additional Protocol II, and a multitude of other international law
authorities. 10 In May 2009, the working group arrived at its conclusion: under
international law, there are civilians, privileged combatants, and unprivileged
combatants. To fall into the latter group and thus be deemed a terrorist, "the
decisive criterion ... is whether a person assumes a continuous function for
[an organized armed] group involving his or her direct participation
in hostilities." I Persons who contribute to armed groups "on a merely
spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized basis" do not qualify. 2 These persons
retain civilian protections, "similar to private contractors and civilian
employees accompanying State armed forces."'
' 3
The United States has several terrorism statutes that sweep much
broader than the ICRC's interpretive guidance. In 1994 and 1996, Congress
made it a crime to provide "material support" either to the commission of
6. INT'L COMM. ON THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 33-34 (2009) [hereinafter
ICRC REPORT], available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htrnlal/
direct-participation-report-res/$File/direct-participation-guidance-2009-icrc.pdf; see also Dieter Fleck,
Shortcomings of the Grave Breaches Regime, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 833, 844 (2009) (describing how
the Interpretive Guidance was developed to clarify "lacuna" in international law, how it was produced
through a series of consultations with academics and government actors, and how it "provides a very
solid and professional body of legal work" to guide the international law community).
7. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 142,
Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
8. Franqois Bugnion, The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Development of
International Humanitarian Law, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 191, 191 (2004) (describing the ICRC as "the main
driving force behind the development of international humanitarian law for 140 years" and documenting
its role in the drafting of the Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocols, and other international
humanitarian law treaties); Leah M. Nicholls, Note, The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates: The
International Committee of the Red Cross and Its 161 Rules of Customary International Humanitarian
Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 223, 228 n.30 (2006) ("The ICRC is consistently called upon as an
expert witness in the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia."); see
also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, 109 (Oct. 2, 1995) (referring to the ICRC's legal expertise in international humanitarian
law).
9. ICRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 12-13.
10. Id. at9.
11. Id. at 33-34.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 34.
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terrorist attacks' 4 or to terrorist organizations.' 5 These provisions are codified
at § 2339A and § 2339B of title 18, respectively. One U.S. court has
interpreted "material support" to include an act as small as contributing
binoculars to a resistance movement, 16 and the Obama administration has
argued that providing a Kurdish separatist group training in international law
also qualifies. 17 In 2001 and 2004, Congress made both "material support"
statutes extraterritorial in reach.'
8
II. MILITARY COMMISSIONS ATA CROSSROADS: DEFINING THE
"LAW OF WAR" ON TERRORISM
The United States's present system of military commissions for
prosecuting terrorist aliens is the product of two statutes. First, following the
Supreme Court's holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 19 Congress passed the
Military Commission Act of 2006, creating a set of Article I courts to try
"unlawful enemy combatants" for "violations of law of war and other offenses
,,20
triable by military commission. Second, in the Military Commissions Act
of 2009, Congress preserved the tribunals created by the 2006 Act but made
several procedural improvements at the urging of President Obama. To date,
the congressionally chartered military commissions have convicted in only
three cases, two of which are now on appeal (the cases of Mr. al Bahlul and of
Mr. Hamdan). 22 Even after being reconstituted under the 2009 Act, the
commissions are yet to adjudicate over a substantive trial; instead, their work
to date has been adjudicating over motions regarding trial procedure,
evidence, etc. 23 However, the Obama administration has announced that it
intends to use military commissions more frequently in combating terrorism,
24
14. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
120005, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006)).
15. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 303(a),
110 Stat. 2224 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006)).
16. Matter of S-K-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 936, 937, 942-46 (BIA 2006).
17. Brief for Respondents at 27-30, Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, No. 08-1498 (U.S.
Dec. 22, 2009).
18. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 805(l)(a)(A), 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2339A) (making "material support" for terrorist acts as an extraterritorial crime); Material
Support to Terrorism Prohibition Enhancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, § 6602, 188 Stat. 3761
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339D) (making "material support" for terrorist groups as an extraterritorial
crime).
19. 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (invalidating the system of military commissions that had been
created pursuant President Bush's executive order in 2001).
20. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948b(a), 120 Stat. 2600.
21. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2190.
According to State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh, these improvements-which range from
making forced statements inadmissible, to restricting hearsay evidence, to requiring mandatory
disclosure of exculpatory evidence-allow for the commissions' inclusion in the administration's
"policy of prosecutions." Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Address at the Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The Obama administration and International
Law (Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Koh Address].
22. David Frakt, Editorial, Terrorists Should Be Tried in Court, CNN.cOM, Mar. 17, 2010,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPfNION/03/17/frakt.military.trials.
23. See U.S. Dep't of Defense, Office of Military Comm'ns, supra note I.
24. Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to Senator Mitch McConnell 3 (Feb. 3, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/cjs/docs/ag-letter-2-3- I O.pdf.
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and should it try the 9/11 plotters in such commissions rather than in civilian
courts, this would be a profound step in such a direction.
As the number of prosecutions before military commissions increases,
the judges will face a yet-unanswered dilemma. What acts of terrorism
constitute "violations of [the] law of war"-law which the commissions have
been directed to apply?
The military commission judges will inevitably wrestle with the
meaning of the "law of war" for two underlying reasons. First, although the
MCA of 2009 empowers the commissions to convict "unprivileged enemy
belligerents" for thirty enumerated offenses in addition to "violations of [the]
law of war," 25 many of the enumerated offense provisions did not apply
extraterritorially before 2001, the time at which many alien detainees were
captured. For instance, providing "material support" to terrorist groups, a
triable offense in a military commission under § 950(t) of the MCA of 2009,
was only given extraterritorial effect in 2004.26 As the petitioners in the
January 2010 proceedings argued, directly convicting combatants captured in
2001 for violating a statute not applicable extraterritorially at the time would
run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 27 Second, the shared wisdom in both
the U.S. Supreme Court and the executive branch is that under U.S. common
law and historical practice, domestic military commissions should only try
aliens for "law of war" crimes, whatever that term entails. In the three leading
Supreme Court cases involving U.S. military commissions and foreign
combatants-Ex parte Quirin,28 In re Yamashita,29 and Hamdan3°-the Court
directed the commissions to apply the "law of war." Assistant Attorney
General David Kris told Congress in July 2009 that "[t]he President has made
clear that military commissions are to be used only to prosecute law of war
offenses." 31 U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Koh in a March
2010 speech defended the commissions, but was careful to describe them only
as "appropriate venues for trying persons for violations of the laws of war."32
25. For the enumerated offenses, see Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84,
§ 950(t)(l)-(32), 123 Stat. 2190; for the "law of war" authorization to the commissions, see id. §
948b(a).
26. See Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Enhancement Act, Pub. L. 108-458, § 6602,
188 Stat. 3761 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339D (2006)).
27. Brief on Behalf of Appellant, supra note 4, at 8 ("Material support for a terrorist
organization ... was not an extraterritorial crime until 2004. Because he could not be charged with this
offense at the time of his capture in 2001, he could not be charged with it in 2008. His conviction on this
charge must therefore be reversed ...."),
28. 317 U.S. 1, 11 (1942) (holding that Congress had acted properly in establishing "military
commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations,
and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals").
29. 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946) (reaffirming that Congress has constitutional authority under the
Define and Punish Clause to "to create military commissions for the trial of enemy combatants for
offenses against the law of war").
30. 548 U.S. 557, 597 n.27 (2006) (plurality opinion) ("[A]s we recognized in Quirin ... and
as further discussed below, commissions convened during time of war but under neither martial law nor
military government may try only offenses against the law of war.").
31. Reforming the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and Detainee Policy: Hearing Before
the H. Armed Serv. Comm., I 1I th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of David Kris, Assistant Att'y Gen. of the
United States).
32. See Koh Address, supra note 21 (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, out of ex post facto concerns, and out of deference to
historical practice, military commission judges will have trouble escaping the
"law of war." But to adjudicate under that body of law, the judges will need to
reconcile-or choose between-the contrasting notions of terrorism under
U.S. and international law.
III. THE PROPOSAL FOR THE COMMISSIONS: STICK TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW DEFINITION OF TERRORISM
This Recent Development proposes that when trying aliens for law of
war offenses, military commissions should apply international law doctrines
on terrorism, not U.S. domestic laws. This recommendation is informed both
by constitutional considerations and by international comity considerations.
First, under Article I of the U.S. Constitution, the jurisdiction of non-
martial law military commissions is rightly understood as limited to applying
the law of war that is embraced by the international community. " The
constitutional license for the government to erect military commissions in the
first place traces back to the Define and Punish Clause, under which Congress
may "define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations." 34 Congress
invoked the Define and Punish Clause in 2006 when it enacted the Military
Commissions Act, 35 and the Clause has been cited in the past as the source of
authority for other non-martial law commissions. 36 But as the text of the
Define and Punish Clause makes clear, Congress's authority-which it can
surely delegate to judges in military commissions if it chooses-is to define
the "Law of Nations," not to create it.
37
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Define and Punish
Clause limits the jurisdiction of "Law of Nations" military commissions to
conduct tribunals according to the international law of war. In Ex parte
Quirin, for instance, the Supreme Court sustained the convictions of eight
German nationals by a military commission because it held that the
defendants were rightly found guilty of war crimes according to "universal
agreement and practice." 38 The Court surveyed the Hague Convention, war
manuals from Great Britain and Germany, and even treatises from Italy to
confirm that first, "combatants [who] do not wear 'fixed and distinctive
emblems"' lose prisoner-of-war privileges, and second, that plotting to
"destroy certain war industries" is a substantive war crime, punishable by
33. The term "martial law military commissions" refers to tribunals established during periods
of military occupation or military government for the purposes of imposing law and order. As the
Supreme Court explained in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, these military commissions are created to replace the
traditional court system, and the executive's authority to convene them traces to constitutional sources
other than the Define and Punish Clause. 548 U.S. at 596-98 (plurality opinion). This Recent
Development is concerned with non-martial law military commissions, namely, commissions
established pursuant to the Define and Punish Clause.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
35. H.R. REP. No. 109-664, pt.1, at 24 (2006).
36. See supra notes 28, 29.
37. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1946) ("We do not make the laws of war but we
respect them so far as they do not conflict with the commands of Congress or the Constitution.").
38. 317 U.S. 1,29-31(1942).
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death under international law. In In re Yamashita, the Court similarly
surveyed international law authorities to confirm that a military commission's
jurisdiction over a Japanese commander had been proper. 40 In Hamdan, a
plurality of the Supreme Court invalidated the jurisdiction of a military
commission over a foreign combatant precisely because it found that
"conspiracy," the crime for which the combatant was to be tried in the
commission, was not a "plain and ambiguous" offense under the international
law of war.
4 1
Not only the Supreme Court but also Congress, at least until recently,
had always acknowledged the constitutional limitations that the Define and
Punish Clause placed on "Law of Nations" military commissions. The
Uniform Code of Military Justice from its passage in 1950 through 2006 had
authorized the President to convene military commissions, but only insofar as
those commissions complied with the international law of war and with the
four Geneva Conventions. 42 It was deeply unsettling to many international
lawyers when the Bush administration proposed, in 2001, to create a system of
military commissions for prosecuting foreign terrorists that departed
significantly from the international law of war.
43
Beyond the constitutional limitations laid out in Article I, the second
reason why "Law of Nations" military commissions should remain faithful to
the international law of terrorism is to preserve comity. If the United States
expects other states to respect the Geneva Conventions, the Hague
Conventions, and other international norms when dealing with U.S. detainees,
then the United States should afford foreign detainees the same treatment. Mr.
Hamdan's lawyers invoked this reasoning in their oral argument before the
39. Id. at 35-37.
40. 327 U.S. at 17-18. The charge against the Japanese commander had been failure "to take
such appropriate measures as [were] within his power to control the troops under his command." Id. at
14-15. The Supreme Court concluded that this charge was grounded in the international law of war "by
any reasonable standard." Id. at 17-18.
41. 548 U.S. 557, 600-02 (2006) (plurality opinion). The Hamdan plurality held that unless
the Define and Punish Clause was read in conformity with international law, military commissions
would be granted a "degree of adjudicative and punitive power in excess of that contemplated.., by the
Constitution." Id. at 602; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-
184) (Neal Katyal) ("What you can't do is use the standalone offense of conspiracy. And here's why.
Because the standalone offense of conspiracy is rejected by international law .... And this Court has
said that the test for a violation of the laws of war is when universal agreement and practice make it a
violation.").
42. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (stating that military commissions may try offenses under "the law
of war"); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 613 (holding that the UCMJ "conditions the President's use of military
commissions on compliance ... with 'the rules and precedents of the law of nations,' including, inter
alia, the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949" (emphasis added)).
43. See Nat'l Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Position of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers on the Draft Military Commission Instruction, in I NAT'L INST. OF MILITARY
JUSTICE, MILITARY COMMISSIONS INSTRUCTIONS SOURCEBOOK 30, 30 (2003),
http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/documents/NIMJVOLI.pdf (arguing that the Bush administration's
instructions for the newly convened military commissions should be rejected because they were not
anchored in customary international law nor in "any of the Geneva or other Conventions on War");
Jordan J. Paust, Antiterritorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 2
(2001) ("In its present form and without appropriate congressional intervention, the Military Order will
create military commissions that involve unavoidable violations of international law and raise serious
constitutional challenges."); id. at 26-27 (arguing that one of the problems with President Bush's order is
that the commissions would not be limited to trying offenses under the international law of war).
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Supreme Court in 2006. Citing Thomas Paine, they concluded their testimony:
"He who-that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy
from oppression, for if he violates that duty, he establishes a precedent that
will reach unto himself.' 44 Here too, should U.S. military commissions define
and apply the law of war with reference solely to domestic doctrines, Paine's
prophetic warning could be realized.45
In the two cases on appeal before the Court of Military Commissions
Review, the federal government rejected the notion that the commission need
adhere to international law doctrines. The government did not refer to the
ICRC's May 2009 report as a relevant legal authority, nor did it limit its
arguments to international law precedents. Rather, the government urged the
commission to first apply U.S. statutes governing terrorism, 46 and second,
apply precedents established in martial-law tribunals during the Civil War,
regardless of whether those precedents have been adopted by international law
or jurisprudence.47 Because these authorities deem conspiracy, solicitation,
and "material support" to violate the law of war, the government claims, the
appellate review tribunal should sustain the convictions below. The problem,
of course, is that the government's argument ignores the directives of the
Define and Punish Clause and forgets the importance of international comity.
Should the commissions follow the federal government's suggestion in
forthcoming cases, the consequences for U.S. constitutional order, for
relationships between the U.S. and foreign states, and for the international rule
of law, would be grave.
44. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 83.
45. Cf. Sean D. Murphy, Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the "War on
Terrorism ": Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons Deemed "Unprivileged Combatants, "
75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1105, 1163-64 (2007) (arguing that the United States should look for guidance
to international law, and specifically to the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, in
determining its detention policies).
46. See Brief on Behalf of Appellee, supra note 2, at 17-18.
47. Id. at 25-30 (urging the commissions to apply precedents from martial-law tribunals
established during the Civil War). The government does also invoke the work of Francis Lieber, id. at
22-24, whose treatises have unquestionably influenced international law, to argue that "systematic
terrorism" is a war crime. Here, the government's arguments are on firmer footing with respect to
international law. However, the key question before the commissions is not whether al Qaeda as an
organization has offended the international law of war. Rather, the question is which individual activities
in conjunction with terrorist groups render a combatant in violation of the law of war-for example,
does material support, conspiracy, or solicitation for terrorist groups qualify? In the sections of the brief
where the federal government addressed those questions regarding individual acts, it referred not to
Francis Lieber's treatises but to decisions by Civil War military commissions. Id. at 25-30. Those
decisions are not reflected in contemporary international law; they are miles away from the ICRC's
Interpretive Guidance.
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